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Abstract
When the goals of internal and external macroeconomic equilibrium are
in conflict, sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange marketmay pro-
vide an independent policy instrument through which the central bank can re-
solve its dilemma in the short run. This paper is concerned with the West
GermanBundesbank'suse of sterilization during the recent years of exchange—
rate flexibility. The paper asks whether the Bundesbank pursued steriliza-
tion during the years 1975-1981, and whether sterilized foreign exchange
intervention exerts a significant influence on the exchange rate in the German
case. Estimation of a stylized Bundesbank reaction function suggests an af-
firmative answer to the first of these questions.
To assess the efficacy of sterilized intervention, a structural
portfolio balance model of German asset markets and prices is estimated. Dynamic
perfect—foresight simulations of the empirical model are used to ascertain whether
imperfect substitutability between foreign and domestic bonds is sufficient to
allow the Bundesbank to attain independent internal and external goals over
the short run of about a month. The model's verdict is that the Bundesbank has
little if any power to influence the exchange rate over that time span without








The conflict between internal and external equilibrium has been a
recurrent theme of the balance—of—payments literature. The conflict arises
when the domestic credit measures appropriate for attaining a domestic
policy target move the economy away from an important external target.
Central banks have often attempted to resolve such dilemmas by sterilizing
the monetary effects of foreign reserve flows in the hope of temporarily
divorcing their domestic policies from balance-of-payments considerations.
Sterilized or "pure foreign exchange intervention leaves money
supplies unchanged but alters privately-held stocks of outside currency—
denominated debt.1 Pure intervention can have no exchange rate effects
when domestic and foreign bonds are perfectly si±stitutablein
portfolios. If debt management policies do influence the exchange rate,
however, they provide a second policy instrument (along with domestic credit
policy) through which the monetary authority can simultaneously achieve its
internal and external targets in the short run.2 The extent to which ster-
ilized intervention is effective in practice is an unresolved issue [see
Genberg (1981) ,Mussa(1981) ,andObstfeld (1982a)].
The recent experience of West Germany illustrates both the nature of the
policy dilemma that may arise under flexible exchange rates and the potential
role of sterilized intervention in dilemma situations. Between the end of 1980
and the end of 1981, Germany faced domestic stagnation, high foreign interest
rates, massive current—account deficits, and a depreciating exchange rate.
The activity slowdown required monetary expansion and a fall in home inter-
est rates. But policies appropriate from a purely internal standpoint
would have worsened inflation immediately, in spite of domestic slack, by
triggering further Deutschemark depreciation. This external side-effect2
reduces the cumulative expansionary impact of a less stringent
monetary policy, and also raises firms' real costs by increasing
thepricesof imported intermediate production inputs. The policy dilemma
could have been avoided if sterilized official dollar sales had
been capable of preventing the Deutschemark fran depreciating in the face
of a less restrictive domestic credit policy.
This paper is concerned with the German Bundesbank's use of steriliza-
tion during the recent years of exchange-rate flexibility. The paper asks
whether the Bundesbank pursued a sterilization policy during the years 1975—
1981, and whether sterilized foreign exchange intervention is effective in
the German case.
The first question is answered by estimating a Bundesbank
domestic credit reaction function. While the policy function postulated is
certainly an over—simplified representation of Bundesbank behavior, it yields
strong evidence that sterilization played an important role. The
estimated sterilization coefficients indicate that only a small fraction of
any change in reserves was allowed to affect the monetary base.
The second question is answered with the help of an empirical portfolio-
3
balance model of German asset markets and prices.To assess the effects of
alternative financial interventions, the empirical model is simulated under
the assumption that agents have perfect foresight concerning future exchange
rate movements. While a transitory change in the monetary base lasting three
quarters is found to have a significant effect on the exchange rate, a tran-
sitory sterilized foreign exchange intervention of equal magnitude is found
to have virtually no effects. This evidence suggests that sterilization is
not an effective "second instrument" in the case of Germany. The finding3
is consistent with Bundesbank accounts of its own recent experience with
pure foreign exchange intervention.
Empirical reduced-form portfolio balance models have been estimated
by a number of authors, including Branson, Halttunen, and Masson (1977, 1979)
Dooley and Isard (1982), Hooper and Morton (1982), Martin and Masson (1979),
and Porter (1977, 1979). In contrast to these contributions, the present
study estimates a structural model of German asset markets. Structural
estimation is necessary if one wishes to identify the channels through which
changes in asset supplies influence the exchange rate. In addition,
structural estimation makes possible direct tests of the hypotheses under-
lying the portfolio balance approach.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a
shortsummary of macroeconomic developments in the Federal Republic of Germany
between 1975 and 1981. Section 3 briefly reviews the portfolio balance model
ofexchange rates and describes the effects of sterilized foreign exchange
intervention. Section 4 reports estimates of a Bundesbank domestic credit
policy reaction function. A portfolio balance model of Germany is set out
and estimated in section 5. In section 6, the effects of sterilized and
nonsterilized foreign reserve sales are studied through dynamic perfect-
foresight simulations of the empirical model. Section 7 offers concluding
remarks. An appendix contains a detailed description of the data and
definitions used in this study.4
2. The conflict between internal and external balance during 1975—1981
The traditional case for flexible exchange rates, as made by Johnson
(1969), held that the abandorunent of fixed parities would free governments
"to use their instruments of domestic policy for the pursuit of domestic
objectives." The experience of the last decade has shown this view to
be too sanguine, at least where monetary policy is concerned. Monetary
expansion induces exchange rate depreciation which feeds into domestic prices
and wages. This, in turn, shortens the short run in which easy money can
keep nominal interest rates low.
When external price and interest—rate shocks lead simultaneously to
recession, inflation, and an external deficit, the exchange rate's sensi-
tivity to domestic credit conditions raises a genuine policy dilemma.
Internal balance demands a fall in interest rates. But the interest-rate
effects of money are dissipated quite rapidly as the accompanying exchange
depreciation causes domestic inflation to accelerate. Indeed, ref lationary
monetary policy may have some contractionary effects, for depreciation
occasions an immediate rise in the production costs of industries using
imported production materials. Intermediate price rises lead to lay-
off s in the affected sectors while reducing profitability and discouraging
investment.
The recent experience of West Germany illustrates the dilemma that
may confront policy makers under flexible exchange rates. (See Table 1.)
At the outset of 1975, the German economy still suffered from the contrac-
tionary and inflationary effects of the 1973-1974 price shocks. In spite
of the danger of exchange rate depreciation, the Bundesbank adopted an
inward—looking monetary policy, allowing the money supply to grow at aTable 1
Economic Developments, 1975—1981
Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Real GNP growth —2.0 5.3 2.8 3.6 4.4 1.8 —0.3
(in %)
CPI inflation 6.0 4.3 3.7 2.7 4.1 5.5 5.9
(in %)
Import price —1.7 6.7 1.5 —3.7 11.6 14.9 14.0
inflation
(in.%)
Change in value —6.3 10.0 10.1 14.4 8.5 —12.1 —12.7
of DM against a
(in %)
Central bank 9.9 S.3 10.0 11.8 5.3 3.0
money growthD
(in %)
Current account 9.9 9.9 9.8 18.1 —11.0 -29.5 —17.1
(billions of DM)
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank annual and monthly reports.
aChges calculated using daily averages for the last month of each period. Negative
entries signify Deutschernark depreciation against the dollar.
bChanges calculated using daily averages for the last month of each period. Central
bank money is defined as currency in circulation plus required reserves on banks' dom-
estic liabilities at constant reserve ratios.5
rapid pace. By summer, recovery was under way. The full force of the
policy dilemma was not felt in 1975, however, for a favorable conjunction
of external factors weakened the inflationary impact of the Bundesbank'S
expansionary measures. First, the current account balance, while declining
considerably from its 1974 level of DM 26.6 billion, remained in surplus
that year.6 Second, the dollar prices of German imports fell as a result
of the worldwide slump. Although the Deutschemark's value against the dol-
lar dropped by 6.3 per cent during 1975, the index of import prices actu-
ally declined over that same period. At 6 per cent, Germany's1975 in-
flation rate was a point lower than it had been during the previous two
years.
Over the following three years, inflation decelerated and the
Deutschemark appreciated strongly against both the U.S. dollar and the cur-
rencies of its major trading partners. After a strong showing in 1976,
the economy grew more slowly in 1977 and 1978. But theDeutschexnark's
strength persisted in spite of brisk monetary growth, helping to dampen
the rate of price increase. In every one of the years 1976-1978 the
Bundesbank overshot its monetary—growth target—-sharply so in 1978,
when the central bank money stock grew by 11.8 per cent.
The decade's second round of major oil price increases began in
late 1978. In spite of the Deutschemark's continuing appreciation over
1979, theimport price index jumped by 11.6 per cent and inflation
accelerated sharply. Contributing to the poorer price performance were
the expansionary stance of fiscal policy and a boom in investmentand inven-
tory demand encouraged by the low level of interest rates over1978. This6
strong increase in aggregate demand more than offset the contractionary
effects of the oil price increases, and the year's GNP growth rate was
high. To conthat the inflationary tendencies, and in particular to pre-
vent the price increases from being built into future wage settlements,
the Bundesbank allowed central bank money to grow at a rate of only 5.5
per cent, near the bottom of the 1979 target range. As monetary policy
grew more stringent, German interest rates followed world interest rates
upward. The year's second quarter saw the emergence of the first in a
series of quarterly current account deficits that was to continue without
interruption until the final quarter of 1981. Germany's new external
weakness would become a major policy problem in the following two years.
Buffeted by an escalating price of oil, the industrialized economies
experienced a distinct slowdown starting in the spring of 1980. In Germany,
however, the pace of economic activity remained relatively strong until the suimner,
and the current account accordingly worsened. After the beginning of
1980 when the dollar stood at an all-time low in the foreign exchange
market) the Deutschemark began to weaken. But U.S. interest rates were tem-
porarily soft during the summer, and the Bundesbank took the opportunity
to speed up monetary growth in the face of the emerging recession. As
the U.S. slowdown ended and as U.S. monetary policy became more con-
tractionary in the early autumn of 1980, dollar interest rates
rose sharply. The rise in U.S. interest rates, coupled with an enormous
third-quarter current deficit (which, at DM 12.7 billion, exceeded the deficit
over the entire previous year), exerted irresistible downward pressure on the
Deutschemark's market value, and forced the Bundesbank to abandon its counter—
cyclical monetary measures. Faced with an accelerating inflation fueled by
steep import price rises and unexpectedly high wage settlements, the Bundesbank7
would risk no worsening of the exchange—market situation.
In the third quarter of 1980, the Bundesbank found itself caught
in the conflict between internal and external balance. Its initial re-
sponse was to intervene heavily in the foreign exchange marketin support of
the Deutschemark while at the same time increasing domestic credit to offset
the contractionary effect of reserve losses on liquidity. Over the course
of the year, the Bundesbank's net external assets fell by DM 25.7 billion
as a result of foreign exchange operations. But between September 1980
and February 1981, the Deutschemark-dollar exchange rate plummeted by
nearly 17 per cent. In the latter month, the Bundesbank decided that in
view of inflationary dangers it could no longer continue to hold
German interest rates constant as U.S. rates increased. Al-
though the economy continued to stagnate, the authorities adopted a decidedly
stringent monetary stance and pushed interest rates upward.
The policy dilemma that arose in late 1980 required a choice
between internal and external balance; the Bundesbank chose the latter.
This course was followed, in the face of strong domestic criticism, until
the final quarter of 1981. With the current account once again in surplus,
with U.S. interest rates on a seeming downward trend, and with unemployment
growing, the Bundesbank initiated a relaxation of domestic credit condi-
tions., But the relaxation was a cautious one. As the Bundesbank explained
in its February 1982 Monthly Report:
.accelerated cuts in interest rates, with the consequence of a
depreciation of the Deutsche Mark, would increase the importation
of inflation and quicken the pace of domestic price rises. A de-
teriorating price climate would undoubtedly lead to new fears of
inflation, and hence inevitably trigger another upturn in interest
rates. The Bundesbank cannot take these risks.8
3. Foreign exchange intervention under imperfect asset substitutability
When home and foreign bonds are imperfect substitutes, debt manage-
ment that leaves monetary aggregates unchanged may influence the
exchangerate. 7Nonmonetary or "pure' foreign exchange market
intervention can take many forms, ranging from sterilized foreign asset
purchases to forward exchange operations to the outright issuance of
foreign-currency debt (such as Carter notes) .Pureforeign exchange
intervention, if effective, provides an independent central bank policy
instruirent and with it, a possible escape from the policy dilemma posed
by domestic stagnation and a weakening exchange rate.
The portfolio—balance model of the exchange rate formalizes the
idea that relative supplies of outside interest-bearing debt as well
as relative money supplies influence the exchange rate.
A brief review of the model illustrates the potential value of debt manage-
ment as a policy tool and serves as background for the subsequent econo-
metric application. 8
The economy considered is one whose residents can hold wealth in the
form of domestic money and in the form of interest—bearing bonds denominated
in foreign or domestic currency units. Foreign bonds and domestic bonds issued
at home are imperfect substitutes: their nominal returns (adjusted for
expected exchange rate depreciation) need not be equal, and there exist
well—defined demand functions for national debts as well as for national
monies. Foreigners may hold domestic bonds, and so domesticmoney is the
only nontraded asset. The relevant asset demand functions are written as:
L(R,y,W/P)W=domesticdemand for high-powered money9
B(R,R* + c,y,w/P)W =netdomestic demand for domestic bonds9
F(R,R* +E,y,W/P)W=netdomestic demand for foreign bonds,
expressed in terms of domestic currency
B*(R -e,R*)W*=netforeign demand for domestic bonds,
expressed in terms of foreign currency
where
R nominal interest rate on domestic bonds
=nominalinterest rate on foreign bonds





Assets are assumed to be gross substitutes; the variables y arid W/P
entering the domestic portfolio—share functions capture the effect of
the transactions level on asset demands, as in Tobin (1969). The wealth
constraint implies that10
L+B+F=l. (1)
The foreign bond rate R* is taken to be exogenous. The domestic
price level P, output y, and the wealth variables W and W' are assumed to
be fixed in the short run.1° Eq. (1) implies that domestic holdings of
foreign assets need not be considered in deriving the economys instant-
aneous equilibrium. Asset—market clearing requires only that residents
willingly hold the stock of base money and that foreign and home
dea-and for domestic bonds sum to the available netsupply. As usual, E,
the exchange rate, is the domestic—currency price of foreign exchange.
With H denoting the supply of high-powered money and D the stock of outstand-
ing government debt not held by the central bank or foreign official
agencies, the asset-market equilibrium conditions are
H =L(R,y,W/p)W, (2)
D =B(R,R*+ E,y,W/P)W + EE*(R —,R*)tJ*. (3)
Given P, y, and W, equilibrium condition (2) determines the domestic interest
rate R. Given the expected depreciation rate E and w,eq.(3) then determines
the euilibrium exchange rate E.
Short-run asset—market equilibrium is depicted in Fig. 1 for a
fixed value of .TheHH locus is horizontal at the unique home interest
rate consistent with money-market equilibrium. The DD schedule consists
of points at which the home bond market clears. A decline in R creates







librium by increasing the home-currency value of the foreign demand. Thus,
DD has a negative slope.11 Momentary equilibrium occurs at the intersection
of HH and DD, where all asset markets clear simultaneously.-2
The conflict between internal and external equilibrium becomes ap-
parent when we consider the effects of domestic credit expansion. These
effects are depicted in Fig. 2 on the assumption that the expected deprecia-
tion rate C does not change. A purchase of domestic assets by the central
bank shifts the HH schedule downward to H'H'. Because the central bank
finances its purchase by issuing high-powered money, a lower nominal interest
rate is necessary for money-market equilibrium. Domestic credit expansion
also shifts DD to the left, to D'D', because fewer domestic bonds
are available to be held in private portfolios)3 In the new equilibrium,
the interest rate is lower but the price of foreign exchange is higher. Any
stimulus to investment is purchased at the cost of increased import costs
and additional pressure on domestic prices)4
Sterilized foreign exchange intervention, when used in concert with
domestic credit expansion, enables the monetary authority to lower the
nominal interest rate in the short run while holding the exchange rate
constant at E. A sterilized sale of foreign exchange is a pure debt swap
which leaves the monetary base unchanged. The cent:ral bank uses foreign
reserves to purchase high—powered domestic money, but at the same time
prevents any decrease in liquidity through an exactly offsetting expansion
of domestic credit. The intervention has no effect on H but decreases D.
It thus shifts D'D' leftward to D"D", which intersects H'H' at the
initial exchange rate E. In effect, the central bank prevents the








































foreign exchange intervention in support of the exchange rate. This policy
would be self—defeating under perfect asset substitutability, for sterilized
intervention would then have no effect on the external value of thecurrency,
The foregoing discussion raises two empirical questions concerning
therecent German experience. First, did the Bundesbank in fact employ
sterilized intervention in an attempt to simultaneously achieveits internal
andexternal objectives? And second, are the actual effects of sterilized
interventionof sufficient importance to offer an escape from the policy
dilemma?These questions are addressed in the next three sections.
4. Did the Bundesbank sterilize?
Estimation of the Bundesbank's domestic credit policy reaction
functionprovides evidence on the extent to whichsterilized intervention
was practiced during 1975-1981. If the Bundesbank indeed followed a
strategy similar to that described in the previous section, domestic credit
should respond positively to cyclical shortfalls in output but negatively
to increases in foreign exchange reserves. Under complete sterilization
the coefficient of the change in foreign reserves is -1, for domestic
credit is systematically varied to offset the effect of reserve acquisitions
on domestic liquidity.
Anissue of considerable importance is the precise definition of the
reactionfunction's dependent variable. The change in the Bundesbank's net
domestic assets does not provide a complete picture of the stance
of domestic credit policy. In addition, variations in reserve requirements
on banks have played an important part in domestic
credit Control. The change in domestic credit, ADC, is therefore defined13
as the increase in net domestic assets minus the reserves impounded by any
increase in required reserves .Thelatter component is calculated as
[REQ(t)—REQ(t—l)IM3(t—l) , (4)
whereREQis the average reserve ratio and M3 is the broadly-defined money
stock. DC includes open-market purchases as well as Bund2sbank lending
to private banks (through discount and Lombard facilities) and to the
central and Lander governments. All variables are defined in detail in
the appendix)-5
Domestic credit is assumed to respond to the increasein reserves,
the current output gap, and lagged price-level inflation)-6 The reaction




In(5), ANFA is the change in the Bundesbank's net foreign assets, valued in
Deutschemarks at a constant exchange rate; GAP is the percent excess of trend
over actual output; and INF is the month-to-month percent increase in the
price level. Because exchange rate fluctuations entail changes in the Deutsche—
mark value of reserves which are not reflected as changes in the monetary base,
the measure ANFA excludes the periodic reserve valuation adjustments made by
the Bundesbank. The reaction function was estimated by nonlinear least squares,
with a correction for first—order serial correlation in u(t))7 The first row
of Table 2 reports the result of estimating (5) over the entire sample period.
The estimated equation supports the hypothesis that the Bundesbank












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































while engaging in sterilized foreign exchange intervention in order to
influence the exchange rate. Over the period 1975—1981, the sterilization
coefficient is negative, large, and highly significant. In addition,
it does not differ significantly from -1, and thus is consistent with a policy
of full sterilization. The coefficient is positive and significant,
providing evidence that countercyclical considerations influenced domestic
credit policy. Further evidence along these lines is provided by the
coefficient of lagged inflation, 7r3, which, while statistically insignifi-
cant, is nonnegligible in magnitude and of the anticipated sign.18
As a check on the stability of policy response during the period
under study, the reaction function (5) was estimated over two subperiods
in which the Bundesbank faced on the whole quite different external condi-
tions. The second and third rows of Table 2 report estimates of (5) over
the sample periods 1975:2—1979:3 and 1979: 4—1981:10. The story told by
these estimates is essentially the same a the one sketched above.
Over both subperiods, the sterilization coefficient is negative and close to
-1. Over both subperiods, domestic credit responds in countercyclical fashion
to output and price fluctuations. The reaction function does exhibit some in-
stability over time, however. The countercyclical coefficients are of much greater
magnitude over the second subperiod. Over the first subperiod, a one—tailed
test indicates rejection of the hypothesis of complete sterilization. The results
are unfortunately too imprecise to allow strong conclusions about policy shifts.
The econometric evidence that the Bundesbank pursued a policy of substan
tial sterilization is in agreement with the published record of Bundesbank
measures.The year 1980, in which the Bundesbank supported the exchange rate15
through massive reserve sales, provides an example. In March of that
year, in order to "offset foreign exchange outflows," the Eundesbank re—
purchased before maturity more than DM 3 billion in paper previously
sold to banks. In April, minimum reserve ratios were lowered and re-
discount quotas were raised in "view of the sustained outflows of foreign
exchange from the Bundesbank." Minimum reserve ratios were lowered further
in September to "offset the contractionary effects of the outflows of for-
eign exchange on bank liquidity." Rediscount quotas were again increased
in October and in January 1981. A further decrease in required reserve
ratios also occurred in January. "A monetary policy guided solely by
external factors would have allowed the contractionay monetary effects of
the balance of payments deficit to work through in full to the domestic
19 economy, the Bundesbank stated.
The finding that sterilized foreign exchange intervention was in
fact pursued does not provide evidence that sterilized intervention
had a significant effect on the exchange rate. Information
concerning the efficacy of policies cannot be obtained from a reaction
function, which merely describes the authorities' behavior. To assess the
efficacy of policies, one needs information about the structure of the
economy. The next sections attempt to evaluate the effects of sterilized
intervention using an empirical model of German asset markets and the
price level.16
5. A structural model of asset markets and prices
In this section a structural monthly macromodel of West Germany is de-
scribed and estimated. The model's financial sector is patterned on the port-
folio balance model set out in section 3, but it has a more complex money
market comprising money supply as well as money demand. Given expectations
and the price level, the financial sector determines the Deutschemark-dollar
exchange rate and the three-month domestic interbank interest rate. A separ-
ate equation describes how the price level evolves over time in response to
lagged inflation and lagged import-price changes. Both output and the three—
month Eurodollar interest rate are taken to be exogenous. While the model does
not explain the level of nominal home wealth, the potential endogeneity of that
variable, along with that of the price level, is recognized in the estimation.
A key problem in estimating the model is the choice of a variable to
proxy exchange—rate expectations. The financial sector submodel is based on
the premise that Deutschemark bonds issued in Germany and Eurodollar deposits
are imperfect substitutes in portfolios. Eurocurrency deposits differing only
in their currency of denomination are assumed to be perfect substitutes, how-
ever, so that the premium on forward dollars in London may be used
in estimation as a proxy for the Deutschernark's expected depreciation rate.2°
By assuming that the expected nominal return on Eurodollar deposits must
always equal that on Eurodeutschemark deposits, the present study neglects
the role of nondiversifiable exchange risk in determining the interest dif-
ferential between onshore German assets and Eurodollar deposits.23- Rather, that
portion of the differential not explicable by expected exchange depreciation is
ascribed entirely to various political risks, such as the prospect
of capital controls.22 A number of recent empirical studies have rejected17
the hypothesis that Eurocurrency interest differentials equal expected depreciation
rates [see, for example, Cumby and Obstfeld (1981)].In adopting the hypothesis
in spite of those findings, I am assuming implicitly that as an empirical
matter, the political risk premium separating covered returns on Euro—
currency and onshore deposits is large relative to the exchange risk premium
separating expected nominal returns on offshore deposits denominated
in different currencies. To the extent that this assumption is un-
justified, the econometric results reported below are biased.
The model's first equation explains the demand, for sight deposits M,
defined as the money stock Ml minus currency in circulation, CURR.
CURR is taken to be exenous to the model. Long-run deposit demand is
proportional to domestic nominal wealth W, with the proportionality factor
depending negatively on the three—month interbank interest rate R and pos-
itively on real income y. The demand function is assumed to have the
form
d a2 M =
a0exp(—a1R)(y)('i/P) exp(u1)W (6)
where u1 is a mean—zero disturbance. The equation estimated is derived
from (6) by taking natural logarithms, assuming gradual adjustment of the
log of nominal deposits to its long-run desired level, and subtracting
log(P) from both sides. This leads to the specification
log(M(t)/P(t)) = — a2log(y(t))+c3log(w(t)/P(t))
+a4log(M(t—l)/p(t))+(1—c)u1(t)
(7)18
The banking system's supply of sight deposits is proportional to the mone-
tary base H in the long run. Supply depends positively on the difference
between R and the central bank discount rate DISCS and negatively on both the
currency/deposit ratio CURR/M and the average required reserve ratio REQ.




with u2 a mean—zero disturbance. By taking the loq of (8), assuming partial
nominal adjustment, and subtracting log(P), one derives the functional form




+ (1 —4)log(H(t)/P(t))+ 4log(N(t—l)/P(t)) + (1 —B4)u,(t).9
The analogue of the money-market equilibrium condition(2) is obtained by
equating the right-hand sides of (7) and (9).
Consider next the equation explaining German holdings of domestic bonds.
The net supply of these bonds available to the German public (BS) is equal to
the indebtedness of the German public authorities (DBT) minus the net dom-
estic assets of the Bundesbank (NDA) minus net foreign private holdings of
domestic bonds (B*):
35=DBT_NDA..3*=D_B*. (10)
The measure (10) ignores forward exchange operations of the Bundesbank, which19
alter the stock of outside domestic ,onds without immediately affecting NDA.
Home demand for domesti.c bonds is given in the long run by
d -c4 c5 B =c0exp(c1R)exp[_c2(R*+€)]exp(—c3DIsc)(y)(W/P) exp(u3)W (11)
where R* and Enowrepresent the three—month London Eurodollar deposit rate and
the three—month London forward premium on dollars, respectively. The variable
DISC enters (11) with a negative coefficient because a rise in the central
bank discount rate discourages bank lending and so decreases overall demand for
23
domestic debt. When coithined with the gradual adjustment of bond holdings, eq.
(11) implies the specification
log(B(t)/P(t)) + — y2(R*(t)+c(t))—3DISC(t)
—y4log(y(t))
+y5log(W(t)/P(t))+(61og(B(t-l)/p(t))+(1-)u3(t). (12)
It remains to specify a structural equation describing foreign residents'
demand for domestic bonds.This demand has actually been negative over
the entire sample period, for foreigners have been net borrowers of Deutsche—
marks. The equation estimated therefore explains the supply of Deutschemark
bonds by nonresidents, i.e., foreign borrowing.
Specification of this structural equation is complicated by the fact
that the borrowers are residents of many countries besides the U.S. Thus,
exchange rates other than the DM-dollar rate enter into the determination of
asset-market equilibrium. The foregoing problem can be avoided by making the
admittedly stringent assumption that all currency areas have essentially
identical DM-bond supply functions. Let the long-run supply function for
currency area i be given by20
-B= E.d0exp[—d1(R -E)]exp(d2R*)exp(u4)W,
where E. is the Deutscheinark price of currency i, W is the nominal wealth
of area i measured in local currency units, and u4 is a stochastic dis-
turbance common to all area supply functions. Note that the supply of
bonds by area—i residents has been written as a negative demand.
If Si is the U.S. dollar price of currency i (S11), aggregate foreign








is the DM-dollar exchange rate and W is aggregate foreign
wealth measured in dollars. To obtain the equation estimated, write (13) in
logarithmic form, assume gradual adjustment of nominal bond holdings, and









The equilibrium condition B +B*=Dcorresponds to condition (3).
The results of estimating eqs. (7), (9), (12), and (14) are reported in
Table 3. All equations were estimated by two—stage least squares, or, when
necessary, by nonlinear two—stage least squares with a correction for first—


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































based on monthly observations over the sample period 1975:1 -1981:10.25
The estimated coefficients have the signs predicted by theory, but
they are not always statistically significant. In particular, the rate—of-
return coefficients in eq. (12) are insignificant and quite small: home and
foreign bonds do not appear to be highly substitutable from the standpoint
of resident bond—holders. In contrast, the interest elasticities of foreign
borrowing are quite large. The short—run elasticity of foreign borrowing
with respect to the covered return R —s(calculated at the sample mean of that va-
riable) is —14.9 ;the corresponding short—run elasticity with respect to R*
is 14.2. These elasticities rise to -77.7 and 73.8, respectively, in the
long run, i.e., after foreign borrowing has fully adjusted to its long-run
desired level.
The equations in Table 3 are consistent with the hypotheses underlying
the portfolio balance approach, but they do indicate the existence of lags in
asset-market adjustment. Adjustment of deposit supply to its long-run level
appears to be immediate, for the coefficient of lagged deposits in eq. (9) is
small and insignificant. Eqs. (12) and (14) provide strong evidence of slow bond-
market adjustment, however, while eq. (7) provides somewhat weaker evidence that
deposit demand adjusts gradually.
As an input to the simulation experiments of the next section, an
equation explaining CPI inflation was estimated. General price-level inflation
was related to its own lagged values and lagged foreign price inflation by the
equation
log(t)) EXib0((.1)) +zelog((: :l) +u5(t),
(15)
where P is the U.S. consumer price index.
Table 4 reports the result of estimating the inflation equation (l5Y byTable 4
TheInflation Equation
(Monthly Data)






























Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. A constant was included in esti-
mation, but its coefficient is not reported.22
ordinary least squares over the sample period 1975:1 to 1981:10. The equation
gives no information about the contemporaneous correlation between the home
inflation rate and international prices; that information is impounded in
the disturbance term u5(t) of (15). The simulations reported below are based
on the identifying assumption that the domestic price level is predetermined.
6. The effects of intervention policies: Simulation results
This section compares the effects of sterilized foreign exchange inter-
vention, which is not allowed to affect the monetary base, and nonsterilized
or monetary intervention, which is fully reflected in the suptly of high—
powered money. The policy comparisons are made by simulating the empirical
model of the previous section under different assumptions about the time paths
of the supplies of base money H and domestic debt D. Exchange rate expecta-
tions play a central role in any evaluation of the effects of alternative
policies. The simulations reported below are based on the assumption that
agents have perfect foresight concerning future exchange rate movements. Thus,the
values for Cfedinto the simulation are the same as the actual depreciation
rates that the simulation predicts.26 Simulations of this type serve primarily
to elucidate the empirical model's structure. The perfect foresight assumption
ensures that the simulated effects of policies are not the result of arbitrary
expectatiorial hypotheses.
Because many foreign exchange interventions are explicitly temporary
in nature, I compare the effects of two transitory interventions, each of
which occurs in January 1979 and is reversed after nine months.The first
of these is an official foreign exchange sale that decreasesthe mone-
tary base by 10 percent (DM 13.25 billion). The second is a sterilizedTable 5
Intervention Policies andtheExchange Rate
Monetary Benchmark Sterilized
Period intervention s iniulation intervention
1979:1 2.5349 2.6126 2.6115
2 2.5330 2.6082 2.6079
3 2.5479 2.6283 2.6266
4 2.5261 2.5710 2.5722
5 2.5120 2.5602 2.5599
6 2.5634 2.6162 2.6148
7 2.5274 2.5470 2.5482
8 2.5177 2.5403 2.5401
9 2.5587 2.5866 2.5855
10 2.5234 2.5174 2.5191
11 2.4943 2.4928 2.4928
12 2.5731 2.5726 2.5726
1980:1 2.4619 2.4620 2.4619
2 2.4559 2.4558 2.4558
3 2.5031 2.5030 2.5030
4 2.439a 2.4390 2.4390
5 2.4171 2.4171 2.4171
6 2.4543 2.4542 2.454223
foreign exchange sale of equal magnitude, the net effect of which is to
decrease the stock of privately—held outside DM-denominated debt by 1DM 13.25
billion while leaving the monetary base unchanged. Both interventions are
unanticipated, but their transitory nature is fully understood. A third, refer-
ence exchange rate path is provided by a benchmark simulation experiment that
uses as input historical values of the base and the outside debt supply.
The simulation procedure is iterative and works as follows.27 All
simulations begin in 1979:1 and end in 1981:9. The three-month forward premium
is written as 400[log(F/E)], where F is the three—month forward rate, and in
each round of simulation, the forward rates for 1981:7, 1981:8, and 1981:9
are set equal to the spot exchange rates prevailing in 1981:10, 1981:11, and
1981:12.28 In the first round of simulation, the remaining forward rates
(1979:1—1981:6) are set at their historical values. Simulation with the fore-
going forward—rate series as input produces a simulated exchange rate path
over 1979:1-1981:9; and that series, led three periods, serves as the input
for F over 1979:1-1981:6 in the next simulation round. The procedure is
continued until the simulated exchange rate series agrees with the exchange
rate series produced in the previous round.
Table 5 reports the results of the three perfect—foresight simula-
tion experiments. The benchmark simulation gives the exchange rate's
perfect—foresight path in the absence of intervention. The benchmark ex-
change rate path is high relative to its historical level. For example,
the benchmark simulation predicts an exchange rate of 2.6126 marks per
dollar in January 1979, whereas the actual exchange rate was 1.8616. The
disparity reflects the fact that many of the events that impinged on the
exchange market over the simulation period were in fact unanticipated. Had24
its subsequent depreciation been foreseen at the outset, the Deutschemark
would have been much weaker over that period. While the perfect-foresight
assumption produces unrealistic exchange rate levels, the simulation pro-
cedure is nonetheless useful for exercises in comparative dynamics.
Consider the effect of a 10 percent decline in the monetary base
lasting three quarters. As Table 5 shows, this monetary intervention
causes an immediate 3•0 percent appreciation of the currency relative to its
benchmark value. Because it is known that the base will rise to its benchmark
level after 1979:9, the exchange rate begins to depreciate to-
ward the benchmark rate. When the base rises abruptly in 1979:10 the
interest rate falls, and because the price level is slightly below the
benchmark level, the interest rate is lower as well. The exchange rate
is above its benchmark level in 1979:10 because a greater expected apprecia-
tion of the Deutschemark must offset this lower home interest rateS
A DM 13.25 billion foreign exchange sale whose monetary effect is
sterilized causes an impact .04 percent appreciation relative to the bench-
mark. This effect is insignificant compared to that of the equivalent non—
sterilized intervention. The exchange rate effect of the lower debt stock
remains insignificant in subsequent periods, although the exchange rate
does depreciate slightly relative to the benchmark in 1979:10, when the
sterilized intervention is reversed. This depreciation is needed to cre-
ate the expected appreciation that persuades asset-holders to demand a higher
stock of DM-denominated debt.
The simulation experiments suggest that the Bundesbank's ability to
influence the exchange rate without altering monetary conditions is very
limited. It is accurate to assert that the sterilized intervention con—25
sidered above has essentially no effect on the exchange rate. In contrast,
foreign exchange interventions that are allowed to affect the monetary
base have a strong impact on the exchange rate, even when they are known
to be transitory. While a permanent sterilized foreign exchange sale would
of course have a somewhat greater exchange rate effect, the effect would
remain small relative to that of a permanent nonsterilized sale.
Further, permanent changes of this type may not always be feasible. A
permanent sterilized foreign exchange transaction of the magnitude contem-
plated here would have caused a 40 per cent change in the Bundesbank's
net domestic assets in January 1979.26
7. Conclusion
Even under flexible exchange rates, the goals of internal and
external balance can conflict. If foreign and domestic bonds
are imperfect substitutes in portfolios, sterilized foreign exchange inter—
vention may provide a "second instrument" (along with domestic credit
expansion) enabling the central bank to reconcile its internal and its
external objectives. The econometric evidence suggests that the German
Bundesbank did attempt to use sterilization in this manner over the period
1975—1981.
To assess the efficacy of sterilized intervention in the German
case, a structural portfolio balance model of German asset markets and
prices was estimated. Dynamic perfect-foresight simulations of the empiri-
cal model were used to ascertain whether imperfect substitutability between
foreign and domestic bonds is sufficient to allow the Bundesbank to attain
independent internal and external goals over the short run of about a month.
The model's verdict was that the Bundesbank has little if any power to
influence the exchange rate over that time span without altering current
or expected future money—market conditions. These findings leave open the
possibility that sterilized foreign exchange market intervention has signifi-
cant but short-lived exchange rate effects which disappear within a month.
Major shortcomings of the empirical model include the sketchy treatment
of price-level dynamics andthefailure to explain the current account and
with it, the level of domestic wealth. Adequate treatment of these factors
v.ould require a much larger model. An additional drawback of this paper's
approach is the neglect of imperfect substitution between Eurocurrency deposits
differing only in their currency of denomination. All these issues are left
on the agenda for future research.27
Appendix
This appendix describes the data and definitions used in this study.
The following abbreviotiotis will be employed: IFS =InternationalFinancial
Statistics; MRD3 =MonthlyReport of the Deutsche Bundesbank; WFM =World
Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York.
Data and definitions appear in alphabetical order.
B: D_B*.
B*: Net foreign holdings of DM-denominated bonds at end of month (in billions
of DM). The series was calculated as the suirtof:(i)net short—term DM in-
debtedness of private banks to foreigners, (ii) net long—term DM indebtedness
of private banks to foreigners, (iii) net DM liabilities to foreigners of
private enterprises arising from short-term financial credits, (iv) net DM
liabilities to foreigners of private enterprises arising from long—term
financial credits, and (v) net foreign DM liabilities of private enterprises
arising from advance payments. Source: MRDB, supplement no. 3.
CURB: Currency in circulation (in billions of DM). Source: MRDB, table 11.1.
D: DET -NDA.
DBT: Indebtedness of the German public authorities (in billions of DM).
Quarterly data on this variable are published in MRDB, table VII.5. Most
issues of MRDB contain in addition a survey of public-sector borrowing in
preceding months. This information (together with information fromMRDB,
table 11.1, on Bundesbank lending to the domestic publicauthorities) enables
one to transform the quarterly debt series into a monthly series withonly
minimal interpolation.
DC: H -\NFA-REQM3(l).
L\NFA:NFA-NFA(-l)minus the change in foreign reserve valuation reported28
until February 1982 in MRDB, Table IX.6(c), column 12.
DISC: Bundesbank discount rate (in percent per annum), at end of month.
Source: WFM.
E: End-of—month exchange rate (Deutschemarks per dollar) .Source:IFS.
E:Three-monthforward premium on dollars in London at or near end of month
(in percent per annum) .Computedas the difference between the three-month
Eurodeutschemark deposit rate in London and R*. Data on the three-month
EuroDM rate come from the Harris Bank (Chicago) Weekly Review (until March 1978)
and from WFM thereafter.
F: NEAPP. ÷
GAP: Computed as 100 times the log of the ratio of the industrial production
index trend cycle to the seasonally-adjusted industrial production index.
For data on the industrial production index, see y.
GOVM2: Public authority holdings of money M2 at end of month
(in billions of DM). Source: MPDB,table1.2.
H: Monetary base (in billions of DM). Computed as the su of currency in




Ml: Money stock Ml (in billions of DM). Source: MPDB,table1.2.
M3: Money stock M3 (in billions of DM). Source: MRDB, table 1.2.
NDA: Net domestic assets of Bundesbank (in billions of DM). Computed as
H -NFA.29
NEAPR: Net external assets of the private sector measured at end of month
(in billions of 1DM). The series was computed as the sum of net external
assets in the five categories listed in the description of B* above, Of
course, this measure aggregates external assets and liabilities regardless
of currency of denomination. Source: MRDB, supplement no. 3.
NFA: Net external position of the Bundesbank at end of month (in billions of
1DM). Source: MRDB, table IX.6 (a), column 12.
P: German cost-of—living index. Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators
(Historical Statistics).
p*: United States price level (CPI—W). Source: Survey of Current Business.
R: German three—month interbank interest rate (in percent per annum) at
end of month. Source: WFM.
R*: Three—month London Eurodollar deDosit rate at or near end of month
(in percent per annum). Source: WFM.
REQ: Average required reserve ratio for German banking system. Computed
from MP.DB, table IV.2. (a), as column 1 divided by column 8.
W: German financial wealth (in billions of DM), calculated as NEAPR ÷ H + DBT -NDA
-GOVM2.
W*: World wealth (in billions of U.S. dollars). Computed as (—NEAPR/E) plus
the measure of world stock market wealth reported in Capital International
Perspective (published by Capital International S.A., Geneva).
y: Index of German industrial production, seasonally unadjusted. Source:
OECD, Main Economic Indicators (Historical Statistics).30
Footnotes
1. A sterilized foreign exchange purchase by the central bank is one
whose effect on the monetary base is offset by a simultaneous and equivalent
sale of central bank domestic assets.
2. The use of Keynesian fiscal policy as a second instrument was advocated
in Mundell's (1968) celebrated writing on the policy mix. The starting
point of that work is the observation that monetary and fiscal expansion
have opposite effects on the capital account because of their opposite
effects on the interest rate. Countercyclical fiscal policy of the type
envisioned by Mundell is currently unpopular in a number of countries,
however. This unpopularity is due in part to the longer-run "crowding out"
effects of government spending and borrowing. It is also due in part to
the concern that government deficits might fuel inflationary expectations.
Fiscal policy interventions of a different sort do not entail the foregoing
risks, and are in fact being pursued. To stimulate investment in the face
of high foreign interest rates, the German government approved a "joint
initiative on jobs, growth and stability" in February 1982. The program
involves a number of investment (and employment) subsidies which are to
be financed for the most part by an increase in the value—added tax.
3. The portfolio balance approach to exchange rate determination under
imperfect asset substitutability has been developed by Boyer (1978),
Branson (1977), Flood (1983), Girton and Henderson (1977), Kenen (1976),
Kouri (1982), Porter (1977), and others. The approach is the open-economy31
analogue of Tobin's (1969) general-equilibrium model of domestic financial
markets.
4. A further distinguishing feature of the present study is its use of
data on bond holdings disaggregated by currency of denomination. The
studies listed in the text use cumulated current accounts (or cumulated
current accounts net of cumulated official intervention) to proxy private net
external asset positions. As many of the authors point out, however, this
procedure is not valid when current imbalances are financed through lending
denominated in several currencies. Alternative structural models of
West Germany are presented by Artus (1976, 1981), who also assumes limited
asset substitution. Frankel (1981) estimates a portfolio balance model of the
dollar—mark rate based on two—period mean—variance optimization.
5. For further discussion, see Dornbusch and Kruqman (1976) and Goldstein
(1980)
6. The precise channels through which the current account influences the
exchange rate remain in dispute. Loopesko (1982) reports evidence that even an-
ticipated German current-account imbalances have exerted significant effects
on the dollar-Deutschemark exchange rate.
7.Imperfect asset substitutability is neither sufficient nor necessary to
ensure the efficacy of nonmonetary financial operations that affect the rela-
tive supplies of bonds denominated in different currencies [see Henderson
(1983) and Obstfeld (l982a)]. For example, if agents internalize the gov-
ernment and central bank budget constraints, as in Obstfeld (1982b), inter-
vention operations that leave current and expected future money supplies un-32
changedexert no effects on asset prices even when asset substitutability is
limited. In setting out the portfolio—balance model and in applying it to
the German data, Ricardian equivalence issues will be left aside. More pre-
cisely, it will be assumed that all government-issued debt represents outside
debt and that private agents do not consider central-bank foreign asset
positions in formulating their own asset demands.
Even with perfect asset substitution [as in Dornbusch (1976) ,forex—
ample], norunonetary intervention policies can influence asset prices if thede-
cisionto undertake them conveys to the mar:et new information about the future
path of the money supply. Mussa (1981) in particular stresses this asachannel
throughwhich pure intervention may operate. The discussion in the text ignores
the foregoing possibility without denying its potential importance in practice.
8. Henderson (1979, 1983), Kenen (l98l),Marston (1980), and Obstfeld (1980) pro-
vide alternative discussions of open-economy financial policy under imperfect
asset substitutability.
9. All bonds have a fixed nominal face value.
10. Exchange rate movements entail capital losses and gains for bond holders,
and so cause variations in nominal wealth even in the short run. In other
words, nominal wealth should be viewed as an endogenous variable. Valuation
effects are omitted here, however, in order to simplify the exposition; their
incorporation would raise no substantive difficulties.
11. When foreign holdings of domestic bonds are ve--as they are in the
case of West Germany-—the DD schedule may have a positive slope. As noted by33
Branson, Haittunen, and Masson (1979), Martin and Masson (1979), Tobin and
de Macedo (1981), and others, monetary expansion can have a perverse effect
on the exchange rate, causing it to appreciate, when one country is a net
debtor in foreign currency. Henderson and Rogoff (1982) and Kouri (1982)
demonstrate, however, that this perversity disappears in more fully speci-
fied dynamic exchange rate models once rational expectations of future
exchange rate depreciation are introduced. Under rational expectations,
monetary expansion causes the exchange rate to depreciate even when for-
eigners have a short position in domestic currency. The empirical simula-
tions reported in section 6, below, assume that agents have perfect foresight
concerning future exchange rate movements. Accordingly, financial policies
move the exchange rate in the expected directions.
12. The view that the exchange rate is set so as to clear markets for asset
stocks does not contradict the fact that the exchange rate adjusts to ensure
ex post equality between two flows, the balance of private external payments
and the official capital account deficit. To see this, assume for simplicity
that foreign official agencies do not purchase domestic assets. Then the
capital account surplus measured in terms of home currency is just the difference
between private foreign acquisitions of domestic securities and the value
of privatedomestic acquisitions of foreign securities over any time interval
[t-l,tJ. Defining B*(R_C,R*)W* and FF(R,R*+C,y,W/P)W, we may therefore




where dots denote time derivatives. By integration, the capital account is34
K =E(t)B*(t)-E(t_l)B*(t_l)-{F(t)-(t-l)}+ [E(T)/E(T)](T)dT
=(EB*)-F+ CG,
where CG =f[E(T)/E(T)J(T)dTis the capital gain on domestically-owned for-
eign assets due to the change in the exchange rate between times t—l and t.
The increase in domestic wealth over the interval [t—l,t] must equal the sum
of the current account surplus (CA) ,governmentdissaving (G —T),andcapital
gains CG. By the wealth constraint (1) and by (2) ,thismust also equal
H + B + F, where B B(R,R*+,y,W/p) Letting NDA denote the central bank's
net domestic assets and FXR the foreign currency value of the central bank's
net foreign assets, we infer from the central bank's balance sheet and
equilibrium condition (3) that
t
CA + (G -T)+ CG =
JE(T)FXR(T)dT












Use of the expression for the capital account surplus K derived earlier leads
to the balance-of-payments identity
t
CA + K =
JE(r)FXR(T)dT.
t— 1
13. The principal tools of Bundesbank domestic credit policy are changes in35
reserve requirements, changes in rediscount and Lombard quotas, and repur-
chase operations, rather than open-market transactions se [see Schlesinger
and Bockelmann (1973) and the discussion in section 4, below]. These policies
affect the asset markets in the saxne manner as open—market changes in D.
Changes in reserve requirements, in particular, change the willingness of the
banking system to lend and so alter the excess nonbank demand for domestic
debt at any interest rate and exchange rate. In addition, changes in reserve
requirements shift HH byalteringthe derived demand for high-powered money.
14. Why must the exchange rate depreciate? The answer comes from consideration
of the suppressed equilibrium condition requiring that residents willingly hold
the portion of the stock of outside foreign bonds not held by foreigners. A
fallin R, given E, leads to excess demand for foreign bonds. An appreciation
of E would reduce the domestic-currency value of the home country's stock of
foreign bonds (assuming the latter is positive) ,andso increase rather than
decrease this excess demand. Since domestic credit expansion lowers R while
leaving the stock of privately-owned foreign bonds unchanged, it must also
cause E to rise. Note that the central bank could increase the base and lower
R by an outright nonsterilized purchase of foreign exchange rather than through
a purchase of domestic assets. This policy does not shift DD and therefore
has an even greater impact on E than an equal domestic credit expansion.
15. Herring and Marston (1977) employ a formulation similar to (4) in speci-
fying the Bundesbank reaction function they estimate over the Bretton Woods
period. Note that our definition of LDC ignores the effects of foreign
exchangeswaps with domestic banks.36
16. When the lagged rather than the contemporaneous output gap was used in
the reaction function its coefficient was insignificant and of the wrong sign.
17.Thevariable GAP is assumed to be predetermined. In the presence of a
systematic foreign—exchange intervention rule, the change in reserves valued
at a constant exchange rate may be correlated with the disturbance to eq. (5).
If such a correlation exists, ordinary least squares estimates of (5) are in-
consistent. more thorough analysis would specify a Bundesbank intervention
function [as in Artus (1976)] and estimate 5) by two—stage least squares.
18. Artus (1976) draws similar conclusions from a domestic credit policy re-
action function estimated over the period 1973:4—1975:7. His estimate of the
sterilization coefficient (-.745) issomewhat lower than those reported here.
Darby and Stockman (1983), like Artus, find evidence of substantial but in-
complete sterilization over the floating-rate period through 1976. Black (1983)
also finds evidence of sterilization, but for a longer sample period (1964:2-
1979:11) that includes part of the Bretton Woods era.
19. The quotations are taken from the Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank
for the Year 1980.
20.Empirical studies show that covered interest parity holds quite closely
in the Eurocurrency markets [see Frenkel and Levich (1981) and Herring and
Marston (1976), among others]. Thus, if Eurodollar and Eurodeutschemark
deposits are perfect substitutes on an uncovered basis, the forward premium on
dollars in terms of DM quoted in London must equal the expected rate of deprecia..
tion of the mark against the dollar. An alternative approach that avoids37
the assumption of perfect substitution among Eurocurrency deposits takes
the realized depreciation rate as a proxy for the expected rate. The econo-
metric issues raised by the alternative approach (along with appropriate
estimation techniques) are described by Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld (1982).
21. The exchange risk premium, which allows Eurocurrency interest differentials
and expected depreciation rates to differ, is studid by Frankel (1979),
Hodrick (1981) ,andStulz (1982), among others.
22. Aliber (1973) has suggested that covered interest differentials between
bonds issued in different political jurisdictions and between home- and foreign—
currency bonds issued in the same jurisdiction, are explicablein part by poli-
tical risks. Dooley and Isard (1980) and Genberg (1981) provide more recent
discussions. Kouri (1976) analyzes a stochastic model in which political/default
risk generates covered interest differentials depending on outside asset stocks.
Capital controls--for exartple, prohibitions on asset sales or interest
payments to foreigners--provide an additional instrument of central bank
policy and are often imposed when the requirements of internal and external
balance conflict. Use of that instrument naturally entails severe efficien-
cy costs. Both existing capital controls and the prospect of additional future
capital controls cause deviations from covered interest parity. The Bundesbank
is empowered to implement capital controls under Article 23 of the Foreign
Trade and Payments Law of 1961. During the closing years of the Bretton Woods
period, significant barriers to capital inflow were erected in an attempt
to salvage the faltering system of fixed parities. Dooley and Isard (1980)
estimate that political risk can at times account for up to 200 basis points
of the differential between the onshore three-month interbank interest rate38
and the Zurich three—month Eurodeutschemark rate during 1970-1974. Most (but
not all) of these capital controls were dismantled in the early years of the
float. One that remained was the prohibition on nonresident purchases of cer-
tain securities (e.g., public authority bonds and money-market paper) first
imposed in June 1972. The stringency of that control was varied in subsequent
years in response to the changing external situation. In January 1974, non-
resident purchases of fixed—interest securities with maturities exceeding four
years were again authorized. The minimum maturity was reduced to two years
in September 1975 (at which time the existing authorization requirement for the
payment of interest on nonresident deposits with domestic banks was also abo—
lished); increased again to four years in December 1977; reduced to two years
in March 1980; and reduced to one year in November 1980. In February 1981,
the prohibition was relaxed completely. It seems reasonable to conclude that
during 1975-1981, the policy environment was one in which the probability of
further capital controls was significant. Transaction costs can of course
explain a portion of the onshore—offshore covered interest differential, but
it is unlikely that they provide a complete explanation. McCormick (1979)
argues that transaction costs are smaller than has been widely believed.
For an application of Dooley arid Isard's (1980) model to the recent French
experience, see Claassen andWyplosz(1983).
23. A more complete specification of the home bond market would disaggregate
resident domestic bond holders into banks and nonbanks. That extension has
been foregone in the interest of simplicity.
24. The instrumental variables for each equation were the logarithm of the lagged
nominal asset stock deflated by P (t—l) (E (t-l) in the case of eq. (14)) plus R* Ct),
R(t—1), log(CURR(t-l)/M(t-1)), log(REQ(t-l)), log(H(t-l)/P(t-l)), log(y(t)),
log(W(t—l)/P(t—l)), log(W*(t)/P*(t)) (where p* is the U.S. CPI), DISC(t—l),39
and log((DBT(t—1)/p(t—1)). This choice of instruments again reflects the
assumption that y(t) may he viewed as a predetermined variable (cf. section 4);
but it allows for the possible eridogeneity of nominal domestic wealth and the
home price level. Note, however, that foreign wealth W* and the U.S. price
level *areassumed to be exogenous.
25. The sample-period starting date was dictated by the nonavailability of
data on the variable 5* prior to 1974:12.
26. The assumption of perfect foresight cannot, by itself, yield a unique
exchange rate path; some terminal condition is required in addition. The
terminal condition assumed in simulation is described below.
27. Simulations were performed on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
TROLL system using a linearized version of the model.
experiments.
28. Note that the same terminal condition is imposed in all three simulation/
The assumption behind this procedure is that the transitory interventions have
a negligible effect on the economy's position two years after their termination.40
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